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This article examines the relation between global space 
and citizenship by examining the cases of WTO meeting 
and Hong Kong Disneyland. Scholars assert that global 
space can unsettle naturalised social relations. Yet, an 
ambiguous and vague sense of citizenship and a neoliberal 
spatiotemporal frame constrain how the state, the media, 
and the locals interpret the meanings of space, and how 
citizenship is manifested in space. In the global space of 
the WTO meeting and the Hong Kong Disneyland, the 
Hong Kong Chinese identity is reinforced by demonising 
South Korean farmers and mainland Chinese. 
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An increasingly integrated global economy has problematical space (Harvey 
1989) just as the industrial revolution has problematical time. Advancement in 
new information and communication technologies is believed to conquer space 
and to accelerate economic transaction. The global fi nancial market relies on 
telecommunications to survive; “just-in-time” production and outsourcing take 
advantages of space erosion for a 24-hour production cycle. Business executives 
negotiate virtually through teleconferencing and e-mail. Cable television and the 
Internet create a virtual space for consumers to shop and to indulge in a consumer 
lifestyle fantasy. Airlines, international hotel chains, global media and entertain-
ment companies work hard to ensure world travellers never leave luxury comfort 
even when they are on the road.
Nevertheless, the access to space and the right to claim space is uneven. Whilst 
the affl  uent global north is not bounded by a geographical area, the global south 
is locked in a local area. The mobility of the global south is oft en questioned and 
scrutinised by lawmakers and the media. Laws and regulations deny the homeless, 
protestors and immigrants the right to space (D’Arcus 2006; Jameson 1998).
Critical scholars from cultural studies and political economy lament the increas-
ingly privatised world dominated by transnational corporations. Public space 
from park to community radio, from arts and cultural venue to commercial-free 
Internet become more scarce. The state increasingly sees citizens as consumers 
who are vital to the economy. It is not surprising that Americans were urged to 
shop to show patriotism aft er the Sept 11 att ack. Scholars and activists argue that 
citizenship will only fl ourish in public space, be it community media, public park 
or knowledge commons.
However, it is questionable if the provision of public space automatically leads 
to a stronger sense of citizenship. First, the concept of citizen implies universal-
ism – that citizens have the same desires and needs. Cultural particularities are 
not taken into account in the undiff erentiated citizen concept. As a result, gender, 
racial, ethnic, cultural and religious identities submerge under citizenship (Young 
1990; 1994). The practice of citizenship has always excluded racial minorities, the 
oppressed class, and the economically disadvantaged (Roche 1994; Taylor 1994; 
Turner 1994; Croucher 2003; Heater 2004; Magnett e 2005). Locke, Spinoza, Rous-
seau and Kant all believed that rationality is required for citizenship; hence, they 
disqualifi ed women, minority groups, slaves and the poor as citizens. 
Second, there is an assumption that citizens themselves understand their rights 
and obligations and that they fi nd citizenship meaningful. The disengagement 
from citizenship is not merely due to a lack of education; it is a result of voluntary 
or forced migration, colonisation and decolonisation, oppression, marginalisation, 
war and state violence, privatisation of common goods, and commercialisation of 
the state and the media.
Third, the availability of and the access to space do not lead to citizenry if 
a neoliberal spatiotemporal ideology constrains citizens’ imagination of space. 
David Harvey argues in Justice, Nature and the Geography of Diff erence (1996) that a 
hegemonic spatiotemporal frame is a meta-narrative of postmodernity; this domi-
nant ideology of time-space relation has to be understood through examining the 
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historical materialist nature of how time and space are constructed. To Harvey 
(1989), globalisation is a spatial problem, a “spatial fi x” is thus employed to absorb 
excessive labor and capital.
The boundary between public space and private space is increasingly blurred. 
For example, the international coff ee chain Starbucks has successfully created a 
pseudo-public space in a private space. Patrons can sit in the coff ee shop without 
interference from the staff . The Starbucks experience probes public libraries to be 
more like a private operator by off ering beverage service and plush sofas. The blur-
ring of the boundary not only allows the state to gather revenue from corporate 
sponsorship, it also helps corporations to appear more like a public service. 
Because the concept of citizenship has the potential to suppress minority in-
terests and it may not be meaningful to all citizens, the state and corporations can 
exploit the term “citizen” to achieve their political economic goals. To most people 
living in developed countries (and arguably in developing countries), they may 
have diffi  culty to recite how their citizens rights are protected by the laws. Yet they 
may have litt le problem with reciting some recent TV advertisements. Aft er all, 
being a consumer is a more tangible experience than being a citizen. Money, not a 
particular gender, race, or ethnicity, is all one needs to be a consumer. Values such 
as success, sex appeal, love, family used in advertisements resonate with consum-
ers more than abstract concepts such as equality and democracy.
Given the above three assumptions about citizenship and space, it is desirable 
to examine the process of how citizenry is constructed by the state, corporation, 
and citizens in a local sett ing (Jones and Garento 2002; Lister et al. 2005). Citizenry 
has to be articulated and negotiated in space. The meanings of citizenship change 
when the meanings of space change. Specifi cally, this paper looks at the construc-
tion of citizenship in a constructed global space – defi ned here as a strategic site 
(usually a city) that accumulates global investment. Bauman (1998) characterises 
global capital as “footloose,” it fl ows to where profi t is. A neoliberal spatiotemporal 
order constrains how social actors experience space and how they make meanings 
of it. Global space att racts both highly paid executives as well as the global under-
class (Isin and Wood 1999; Sassen 2001). The infl ux of workers, tourists, business 
executives to a dynamic, fl uid, ever-changing global space probes social actors to 
renegotiate social relations (Harvey 1989; Massey 2005).
As a global city, a Special Administrative Region of China, and a former British 
colony, Hong Kong provides many examples to show how the state actively builds 
global space to att ract global capital aft er decolonisation. The question of the Hong 
Kong Chinese identity has interested scholars prior to and aft er the handover in 
1997. Yet few have examined how the changing meanings of space relate to the 
construction of the Hong Kong Chinese identity. The two events that illustrate 
the construction of citizenship in a global space are the Sixth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in 2005 and the construction of the Hong Kong Disneyland. In the case 
of the WTO meeting, the arrival of international delegates and protestors could 
have probed the locals to rethink what public space means and how citizenship 
is created in space. However, the media interpret the meanings of space with a 
capitalist spatiotemporal ideology. In the case of Hong Kong Disneyland, both the 
state and the Disney Corporation justifi ed the construction of the park by replacing 
the concept of citizen with consumer. Both instances of global space have opened 
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up questions of citizenship, race, and ethnicity in a local sett ing. Rather than con-
fronting issues related to the Hong Kong Chinese identity, race, and ethnicity in 
the global economy, the local media opted to single out South Korean farmers and 
mainland Chinese as villains who threatened the Hong Kong economy and the 
Hong Kong Chinese identity.
The Hong Kong Chinese Identity, Colonial Place, 
Postmodern Space
In order to att ract global capital, states and cities have to develop strategies to 
stay competitive in the global economy. The astonishing economic development of 
the four Asia’s litt le tigers is viewed as model examples that developing countries 
can follow to survive the economic globalisation. A locally situated analysis is 
needed to examine how the state has historically justifi ed political and economic 
arrangements through the discourse of citizenship. The sense of citizenship that 
has been constructed is hardly an inclusive concept. To these days, there is no sat-
isfactory Chinese term for the concept of Hong Kong citizens. In Chinese, “Hong 
Kong people” and “Hongkonger” are the two closest but unsatisfactory terms. 
This paper uses the term “Hong Kong Chinese” because, as will be argued below, 
the citizen concept is racially and ethically exclusive. Precisely because there is 
no Chinese term for Hong Kong citizen, the state, the media and the locals have 
reinvented the Hong Kong Chinese identity to fi t their goals, particularly during 
political and economic unstable times.
When Hong Kong was annexed as a British colony in 1842, there was no “Hong 
Kong Chinese” – there were Chinese (as a race) and Westerners. Although most 
Westerners were British, the ambiguous Chinese term “sea people” was used rather 
than British. In the fi rst hundred years of colonisation, Hong Kong was a fl uid 
space. Westerners came to Hong Kong to govern, to trade, and to preach. Chinese 
moved across the border between Hong Kong and mainland China freely. There 
was no active government programme to establish Hong Kong as a home for both 
Westerners and Chinese.
Turner and Ngan (1995) argue that the Hong Kong Chinese identity was 
manufactured and imposed upon the population by the colonial government in 
the 1960s. It was essential to create a place, a permanent home, for Hong Kong 
Chinese. Students underwent a colonial education learned that Hong Kong is an 
“east-meets-west, international city.” Hong Kong Chinese, as the locals call them-
selves, were described in government literature as westernised Chinese who follow 
Chinese traditions but enjoy western modernity.1
The “Star Ferry Riot” in the sixties was reckoned to be the incident that alarmed 
the colonial government that communist-backed groups may cause social unrest 
and may overturn colonial rules. A dramatic fare hike proposed by the Star Ferry 
Company ignited the locals to stage protests against an oppressive colonial re-
gime. The state believed that the protest was supported by communist groups, so 
it employed violence to stop the demonstration. Soon aft er, in order to discour-
age the locals from identifying with the Chinese Communist Party, the colonial 
government designed a Hong Kong Chinese identity for the locals. The state and 
the media oft en use women to represent modernity (Young, 2003; Rajan 2004; on 
the case of India). A gendered identity, the “factory girl,” was hence designed: she 
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was an economically independent, new woman who laboured to boost Hong Kong 
productivity. Aft er work, she enjoyed modern and western entertainment such 
as catching a Cantonese fi lm or listening to the Beatles (who were fl own to Hong 
Kong by the colonial government). 
This manufactured notion of “Hong Kong Chinese” is a race/ethnicity-based, 
consumer identity. Hong Kong had become a home that could not accommodate 
non-Chinese. Non-Chinese minorities such as South Asians were and still are 
treated as foreign subjects – even though some of them have lived in Hong Kong for 
generations. British and other western nationals were seen as the superior “Other” 
whilst Indians and Filipinos were treated as the inferior “Other.” By designing the 
Hong Kong Chinese identity, the state has successfully used race and ethnicity to 
reduce locals’ hostility towards the colonial government by oppressing the non-
white, racial/ethnic minorities. Race is used by the state to achieve political ends 
(Cynthia Enloe cited in Croucher 2003; Abah and Okwori 2005).
The Hong Kong Chinese identity campaign was clearly a successful one. By the 
1980s, this identity was portrayed in popular culture and government literature 
as a modern, westernised, English-Cantonese bilingual who lives a fast life in the 
hustle-bustle of the skyscraper city. This Hong Kong Chinese is unlikely to be fl u-
ent in Mandarin, nor is she knowledgeable of Chinese politics and contemporary 
culture (incidentally, Chinese history textbooks curiously left  out any mention of 
the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party). This Hong 
Kong Chinese is fearful of the communist regime yet she has an abstract notion of 
Chinese nationalism (Teo 1997). On the other hand, she is not a patriot of Britain 
and is indiff erent to British culture and politics. The ambiguous identity is best 
illustrated by Hong Kong Chinese’s support of the Chinese team at Olympic but 
of the English football team at the World Cup. The consumer lifestyle that Hong 
Kong Chinese led diff erentiated them from mainland Chinese, who at that time 
still lived in a relatively closed-door Communist China. The Hong Kong Chinese 
identity epitomises what a postmodern identity ought to be – fragmented, hybri-
dised, consumerist, popular culture-oriented, ever changing, and amnesic of history 
(Abbas 1997; Stokes and Hoover 1999). 
The process of decolonisation had created a context for Hong Kong Chinese to 
question the permeability of Hong Kong as a home. The Beĳ ing Massacre in 1989 
and the Sino-British negotiations of the city’s future stirred up heated debate about 
the implications on citizenship. A tangible colonial place that had been the “home” 
of Hong Kong Chinese has suddenly transformed into a liminal, intangible space 
of uncertainty. Massey (2005) writes that place is oft en seen as closed and coher-
ent; as “home” or a secure retreat. Space, on the other hand, is an open fi eld full of 
possibilities but uncertainties. Beĳ ing’s refusal to implement a democratic political 
system and its employment of violence on June Fourth intensifi ed the uncertainty 
and fear among Hong Kong people. Since the commencement of the Sino-British 
negotiations in 1984, the well-to-do and the professional class hurried to emigrate 
to Canada, the US, Australia, and the UK for a more certain future in a place that 
would not dissolve into space. Although Deng Xiaoping promised “fi ft y years no 
change” aft er the handover, the Hong Kong homeland would gradually dissolve 
into her motherland China, which is made alien to Hong Kong Chinese both politi-
cally and economically. 
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On the British side, fearing the arrival of a few millions Hong Kong-born Chinese, 
the British Government ruled them to be naturalised British nationals (overseas), 
BN(O) in short, who have no rights to abode in the UK. BN(O) is space-bound and 
time-bound; it cannot be passed on to the next generation. The BN(O) status is only 
an indication that one is born in a British colony, it does not guarantee any citizen 
rights under British laws. When Hong Kong ceased to be a colony, BN(O) became 
a memory, an identity of the past. 
In order to curb the uncertainty that Hong Kong people felt towards the dis-
solving homeland into space, the government teamed up with entertainers to run 
a “Hong Kong is my home” campaign. Canclini (2001) and Croucher (2003) both 
agree that citizenship is a sense of emotional belonging and it provides a sense of 
diff erence. Home is a powerful metaphor for a private, enclosed space for one to 
develop an emotional att achment.
A decade aft er Hong Kong became the Special Administrative Region (SAR) 
of China, the city-sate government, the PRC, and the locals still att empt to deter-
mine what Hong Kong is to China, and what China is to the world. An integrated 
global economy has impacted nation-states of diff erent sizes and diff erent politi-
cal systems. To examine the transformation of Hong Kong as a space governed by 
neoliberal economic rules, it is essential to take into account both the transforming 
political economic power of China and the Chinese Central government’s determi-
nation to show the world the feasibility of “one country, two systems.” 
As a small city-state, Hong Kong has to re-invent its narrative for both the lo-
cal and the global audience to survive the economic globalisation. Facing the rise 
of Shanghai as an international city, and neighbouring Shenzhen as a gigantic 
export processing and a special economic zone, the Hong Kong SAR government 
reinvents Hong Kong as an “Asia’s world city.” Abbas would call it a déjà disparu 
identity: “what is new and unique about the situation is always already gone, and 
we are left  holding a handful of cliches, or a cluster of memories of what has never 
been” (Abbas 1997, 23). This newly designed identity reinforces the postmodern, 
hypercommercial, and capitalistic nature of colonial Hong Kong. The geographi-
cal locale that Hong Kong identifi es with is Asia, a vast continent that is culturally 
diverse. Whilst China is a political economic entity that is confi ned to a nation-state 
boundary, Asia is an imagined region constructed by the West during the colonial 
era. Hong Kong’s former self, an international city is a physical meeting place for 
diff erent nationals; Hong Kong’s present self, a world/global city, on the other hand, 
is imagined to be a boundaryless space that serves as a node for the fl ow of capital, 
personnel, technologies, culture, and ideas. The identity “Asia’s world city,” more so 
than the former colonial self “an east-meets-west international city,” erases cultural 
and political att achment to China. According to Sassen (2001), global cities connect 
to each other more than to their respective states. The reference points that Hong 
Kong chose are not China, but Shanghai, Beĳ ing, Singapore, Taipei, and possibly 
Tokyo. In order to prove that Hong Kong is indeed a world city, the SAR govern-
ment accommodated two visible global power—the WTO and Disney.
The Freedom-Loving Capital
The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference took place in Hong Kong in 2005. To both 
its supporters and critics, the WTO represents a global power in international trade. 
27
The power locus of the global political economy is “foot loose,” Zygmunt Bauman 
(1998) calls it the “bodylessness” of power. The power is not rooted in a place, rather 
it fl ows around space. Nevertheless, neoliberal globalisation in the form of global 
talk requires a specifi c locale to manifest itself. Globalisation manifests itself in an 
intensely local sett ing; yet the contexts are the least local (Appadurai 2001). Similar 
to previous WTO conferences, global movements protest at the WTO meeting in 
Hong Kong att racted intense local and international media interest. Klein (2004) 
claimed that protestors take back the commons by questioning the relations between 
citizenship and space by occupying public place. However, most local residents 
experienced the WTO protest from news outlets. The media interpret what space 
means, and how citizenship is experienced in a global space.
Literature on the relationship between the media and social protests has pro-
vided a rich foundation upon which the media coverage of mass demonstration 
can be studied. Most studies assert that the media frame social protests as events 
of news values, and that organisational norms and practices govern the news 
frame (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). At the same time, the media utilise tactics to 
present themselves as objective, detached, and neutral (Gitlin 1980; Hackett  1993; 
Hertog and McLeod 1995). Local media coverage of the WTO protest used a lot of 
commonly-recognised news values2: offi  cial sources (Gitlin 1980; Kim 2000; Chen 
2005); elite interests (Gitlin 1980; Hackett  1993; Small 1994; Hertog and McLeod 
1995; McLeod 1995; Undrakhbuyan 2005); violence (Gitlin 1980; Hackett  1993; Small 
1994; Martindale 1989; McLeod 1995; DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Kruse 2003); devi-
ance (Gitlin 1980; Shoemaker 1984; Hackett  1993); sensational elements (Gitlin 1980; 
Hertog and McLeod 1995); and focus on the individuals (Gitlin 1980; Gamson and 
Wolfseld 1993; Small 1994; Hertog and McLeod 1995). 
Past studies tend not to examine how the media represent space. As institutions 
with economic motivations, the media are governed by a neoliberal spatiotemporal 
order. For example, evening news is broadcast at a time when the economically ac-
tive population begins their leisure time in a private sett ing; salient news items are 
allocated with more time; advertising time is sold to generate revenue (Moores 2005). 
Not only are news items edited in a capitalistic fashion, the spatiotemporal order 
represented in news stories also adheres to the neoliberal economic principles. 
Critical scholars agree that public streets and space are common goods: in a 
democratic society, citizens can participate in street protests; citizens can gather in 
public places for social, cultural and political purposes; citizens have the rights to 
feel safe in the streets. In contrast, in a consumer society, the streets are transformed 
into shopping and commerce zones where fl âneurs stroll, observe, and consume. 
Some cities have restricted citizens’ right to use public space. For example, the city 
of Seatt le has passed a city regulation that prohibits individuals from sitt ing down 
on a sidewalk if not for emergency assistance, rallies, parades, waiting for buses, 
or consuming food and beverage in a street cafe (Mitchell 2003). A translation of 
this regulation reads: the homeless cannot sit on a sidewalk because they will bring 
inconvenience to the locals and the tourists. The homeless citizens’ rights to space 
are blatantly denied in an increasingly privatised world. Assessing the urban space 
in Hong Kong, Cuthbert and McKinnell stated that:
Given the nature of urban development in the context of Hong Kong, history 
is slowly extinguished, rights are lost, urban space becomes increasingly 
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subject to surveillance and policing, human activities become restricted and 
the public realm loses its clarity as a symbol of civil society (Cuthbert and 
McKinnell, 1997: 296).
During the meeting period, the convention venue and its surrounding area were 
transformed into a sacred global space. The WTO meeting site at the Hong Kong 
Convention and Exhibition Centre was transformed to symbolise a space where 
“globalisation is in process.” Broadcast news helped to construct a familiar local 
site into a culturally-nonspecifi c space that represents “global power.” The Hong 
Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre is connected to a number of fi nancial 
buildings in the area by pedestrian bridges, which are like arteries to the heart. In 
order to protect the heart of global economy, the police protected the veins as well. 
The vulnerability of this global space was accentuated by the police’s painstaking 
security eff orts. Similarly, aft er Sept 11 att ack, along with the White House, Dis-
neyland also increased security; McDonald’s and Starbucks, symbols of economic 
globalisation, were sites for att ack during the WTO protest in Seatt le.
In a global space, the global north has the maximum access to space whilst the 
mobility of the global south is scrutinised and monitored. The media intensely 
scrutinised how protestors (in particular, South Korean farmers) moved around the 
city while questioning their rights to visit and to mobility. In contrast to the luxury 
hotels where the WTO delegates stayed at and the fl ashy cars that transported them 
to the meeting venue, the media showed the dilapidated city hostels and recreation 
houses where the protestors stayed at. The protestors were marginalised spatially 
and economically: The media pointed out that the protestors brought along cup 
noodles and fruit to Hong Kong. Unlike Disneyland tourists, the media did not 
view protesters as tourists who might benefi t Hong Kong economically. The media 
acted like a prison guard stationed in a panopticon by continuously scrutinising 
the “criminals.” The media closely monitored the behaviour of South Korean 
protestors – from their napping and exercising in public parks, to the uniforms 
and national costumes that they wore during protest. On the contrary, the story 
assigned insignifi cant roles to WTO delegates; EU Commissioner Peter Mandelson 
occasionally acted as the talking head to remind the public that the WTO negotia-
tions were indeed in process. The litt le airtime allocated to WTO delegates seemed 
to legitimise the activities inside the convention; hence they needed no monitoring 
from the media.
Space of representations made protests visible to the local and the media (Mitch-
ell 2003). Scholars commonly reckon that the media do not report news, but con-
struct reality and represent it as the truth. Although global movements protestors 
have become more savvy to use space, their actions are mediated by the media. TV 
news constructs protest as exotic, violent spectacle that needs to be surveyed and 
monitored. News stations strategically dispersed reporters to a number of public 
sites to provide the audience with multiple localities simultaneously. Low angle 
shots were commonly used to capture street protests. Insuffi  cient knowledge of 
grassroots movements led journalists to interpret for the audience what the protest 
tactics meant. A journalist called the protest “carnival-like”; another interpreted 
street theatre, performance, and story-telling as entertainment and called them 
“music night show” and “cultural show.” The neoliberal spatio-temporal order 
has constrained how space is understood and used by citizens. The powerful 
29
entertainment industry in Hong Kong has naturalised all forms of performance 
as consumption and has denied the political agency of the performers. In a truly 
public sphere, means of expression such as singing, dancing, and acting are prac-
tices through which citizens exercise their agency to probe for social change and 
collective action.
If the WTO delegates represent the global north and the protestors represent 
the global south, then where are Hong Kong people? Sassen (2001) asserted that 
global cities provide a space for the global underclass to form coalition. Although 
social relations can be reinforced in a global space, the fl uidity of global space can 
also unsett le naturalised social relations. For example, although few Hong Kong 
Chinese are farmers, the working poor can identify with the harsh living condition 
of farmers elsewhere. Instead the media downplayed the signifi cance of the fl uid-
ity of global space. It encouraged Hong Kong Chinese to seek home – a physical 
locale at times of uncertainty. Juxtaposed with what the media called a colourful 
march were clips of interviewed citizens who expressed their fear of violence and 
their desire to go home. When it is uncertain who has the right to claim space, 
home becomes a powerful metaphor for a sense of att achment and belonging. As 
discussed, the Hong Kong government told Hong Kong Chinese that Hong Kong 
is “our home” during times of political uncertainty.
In order to accommodate the WTO meeting, the Hong Kong government heav-
ily restricted traffi  c in the downtown area. The media highlighted stories about 
traffi  c detour, suspension of public services and businesses, and the inconvenience 
experienced by the public; only the economically active population was seen as 
citizens (Dagnino 2005; Lister et al. 2005). The working public, small business owners 
and taxi drivers were used to represent citizens’ voice. The media did not care too 
much about how the economically inactive and the marginalised citizens (such as 
the homeless) felt about the road blocks. Filipino domestic helpers in Hong Kong 
gather in public space on holidays; a restricted downtown area may limit their 
rights to gather. However, as the media and the government have long neglected 
the citizen rights of this labour class of foreign national, their right to space was 
not deemed as an issue.
When asked how the government can help employees to commute to work, 
an offi  cial advised companies to implement fl exible workdays for employees, and 
advised employees to take annual leave or telecommute from home. To the gov-
ernment, workers’ inconvenience should be subordinate to that of the companies 
and Hong Kong productivity. The Hong Kong Chief Executive and the Conference 
Chairman both expressed empathy for the Hong Kong people but insisted that citi-
zens need to contribute to Hong Kong’s commitment to free trade. This illustrates 
Jameson’s (1998) point that the freedom of capital compromises citizens’ freedom 
of mobility. Aft er the WTO meeting, the Chief Executive and various high-level 
offi  cials staged a high-profi le PR event for the media. The government expressed 
its concerns to aff ected businesses, and proposed to bus mainland Chinese tourists 
to aff ected areas to stimulate consumption. As will be further discussed in the next 
section, mainland Chinese are only granted mobility in the city if they consume.
Some citizens questioned their rights to mobility, but they tended to blame the 
protesters and government offi  cials rather than the WTO delegates. This illustrates 
that the most powerful have the privilege to maximum mobility and enjoy a com-
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mand of space. The government and the media affi  rm WTO delegates’ legitimacy 
as political actors, hence their behaviours and actions were not monitored at all. 
Similarly, large companies could choose the sites of operation and control the fl ow of 
labour through renting offi  ce space elsewhere and through demanding employees 
for accommodation at the expense of employees’ extra time to commute.
Whilst some Hong Kong Chinese expressed a desire to go home in the dis-
orienting global space (Morley and Robin 1995), others were spectators in global 
space. In the majority of news reports, Hong Kong Chinese were represented as 
passive onlookers who took pictures and recorded video of the events from outside 
the protest areas. The behaviour of the onlookers was not unlike those of Disney 
visitors. As will be mentioned in the next section, a consumer society has trained 
members to be quiet citizens. Thoroughly trained as consumers, Hong Kong 
Chinese view protests as a spectacle like a Disney parade where onlookers can be 
passive participants who consume images of no depth. In line with what Baudrillard 
wrote about simulacra (Baudrillard 2001), Hong Kong Chinese believe that the im-
ages do not represent anything other than the images themselves. This postmodern 
understanding of protests epitomises how a neoliberal spatiotemporal order has 
masked material relations as symbolic ones.
There were few instances in which the media reported on Hong Kong Chinese 
who transcended naturalised social relations. A few sympathetic Hong Kong Chi-
nese expressed pity towards the South Korean protestors. Women were used to 
represent the Mother whose love transcends cultural, linguistic, national, racial, and 
ethnic boundary: a woman was shown treating South Korean farmers to Canton-
ese dim sum, and she was quoted as feeling sorry for their economic deprivation. 
Another woman told a TV journalist that she has wept aft er watching the protest. 
In both cases, South Korean protestors were reduced to the status of children who 
needed to be taken care of by a Mother.
The media have largely neglected Hong Kong Chinese who participated in the 
protest as public citizens. The media barely mentioned there were Hong Kong 
citizens among the protesters but gave no exact number. A news story showed a 
marching local public servant who expressed concerns about the privatization of 
the service industry and the potential harm that it would pose to local workers. This 
story was not followed up. Furthermore, the media questioned the rationality of two 
Hong Kong citizens who joined South Korean farmers waiting to be arrested. 
Global space could unsett le naturalised social relations by having the global 
north interacts with the global south. In the Hong Kong media coverage of the WTO 
meeting, the media sidetracked the relations between the WTO delegates and the 
protestors. It instead focused on the relations between the protestors and Hong 
Kong Chinese. The antagonising relation is reinforced by the diff erence between 
South Korean farmers and Hong Kong Chinese in a global space. 
Social groups are pitt ed against one another for economic survival in the global 
economy. Factory owners exploit predominately women workers by threatening 
that their exploitative jobs will be taken away to another country if they do not ac-
cept the long hours and the low pay. American workers are told by politicians that 
overseas workers have taken away their jobs. African American workers gradually 
fi nd their low-paying jobs have been taken away by Hispanic workers. The race to 
the bott om occurs locally, nationally, and globally. In the media coverage of the WTO 
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protest in Hong Kong, South Korean farmers were singled out as the group that 
clogged the fl ow of money and capital of Hong Kong, and hence the livelihood of 
the population. WTO delegates and other proponents of the global economy were not 
alleged in the media to be the powerful social actors who decide how the production, 
distribution and consumption of goods, wealth and resources should be allocated. 
The footloose global capital was not blamed for job losses. Instead, a diff erent, alien 
group is said to take away the rights to survive from some other groups. 
Disney Citizens
For many men and women, especially youth, the questions specifi c to citizen-
ship, such as how we inform ourselves and who represents our interests, are 
answered more oft en than not through private consumption of commodities 
and media off erings than through the abstract rules of democracy or through 
participation in discredited political organizations (Canclini 2001, 5). 
The second case of global space discussed is the construction of Hong Kong 
Disneyland. This case is illustrative of how public money was used to build a pri-
vate, global space in the name of benefi tt ing the public. Ironically, private space 
such as Disneyland has become a site that resembles a public space in an increas-
ingly privatised world. Disneyland citizens are those who consume both material 
goods and images. Similar to the case of WTO protest, a global space unsett les 
social relations. Yet the media seized the chance to reinforce the consumerist ideal 
of the Hong Kong Chinese identity while singling out mainland Chinese as clue-
less consumers.
The innocent discourse of Disney has taught consumers to be quiet citizens who 
question litt le about social relations and regulated practices. Disneyland exemplifi es 
a neoliberal, global space. Disneyland can be built in any city in the world as long 
as the location can att ract enough visitors. Regardless of the geographical location, 
Disneyland is void of any local reference. Visitors are reminded that they are in 
the magic kingdom. The capital that funds Disneyland is footloose. The Disney 
Corporation can sell its stakes in Hong Kong Disneyland and charge for manage-
ment and licencing fees only. Tokyo Disneyland, for instance, is not owned by the 
Disney Corporation.
In order to fulfi l its ambition to be the Asia’s World City, the Hong Kong govern-
ment used public money and exploited public trust to reach the business deal with 
Disney. Hong Kong Disneyland is a collaboration between the Disney Corporation 
and the Hong Kong Government. Disney hopes the amusement park will provide 
an avenue for mainland Chinese to learn to be Disney citizens/consumers before 
the Chinese Central Government loosens regulations on imported foreign fi lms and 
television shows. The Hong Kong Government believes that the park will help to 
establish Hong Kong as a global city (Lo 2005). Defending the exorbitant amount 
to build the park, the former Chief Secretary Anson Chan said that both Disney 
and Hong Kong are internationally well-known brand names, hence one cannot 
put a price on Disney choosing Hong Kong as a partner.3 
The government paid for 90 percent of the construction costs but it only owns 
57 percent of the park. It also has to bear the cost of building a new railroad, public 
facilities (such as fi re station), and infrastructure (such as highway). At the initial 
stage, the government’s astronomical expenditure on the construction and infra-
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structure far exceeds the potential profi ts. The negotiation was hardly democratic; 
the public was not informed of the closed doors talk until the agreement was 
reached. To defend the question of whether the business deal is fair, the former 
Chief Secretary responded that Hong Kong people could assume ownership of the 
park. The discourse of “ownership” society asks citizens to realign themselves as 
stockholders in a private market in which the individual is a consumer who makes 
rational choices about expenditures (Miller 2007). The Financial Secretary further 
urged the public to focus on the economic return to the community. However, 
some Christian groups doubted if the working class would benefi t. Furthermore, 
Disneyland employees are subject to some appalling working conditions: short 
notice of work schedule, 13-hour workday, unpaid lunch break, inadequate recess 
time and rest area.4
As a private space, Disneyland att empts to replicate many remnants of public 
space. One of the main att ractions Main Street USA is modelled aft er the town centre 
of US Midwest small towns in the early 1900s. Main Street USA was imagined to be 
a place where citizens meet and exchange latest news. The daily parade borrows 
its concept from Independence Day parade where citizens practise citizenship by 
showing patriotism. Regardless of one’s gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, and 
age, visitors are treated equally and courteously by staff  members. Once visitors 
enter the park, they are free to roam around the park without interference. In a 
privatised world, it is gradually diffi  cult for citizens to walk in a roomy space that 
is safe, clean, and commercial-free. The identical treatment that all visitors receive 
may be disguised as equality in a democracy.
Disneyland is constructed as a space where there is no death, no sickness, no 
sadness, no terror and no everyday worries (Wasko 2001). Disneyland management 
carefully plans how the park is utilised, including how visitors should occupy 
space, how they should fl ow in space, and how much time they should spend in 
a particular space.
Disney also controls interpretation of the park by actively rejecting any negoti-
ated and oppositional readings of it. When the mother of this author pointed out the 
Saharan animals in the Adventureland are fake, the boat captain replied that they 
are actually real. The second time when we took the boat trip, a diff erent captain 
delivered the same script, but we learned how to answer the questions correctly.
Disney’s ambition is to shape how visitors think, behave, and act in the way 
that the company wants them to (Giroux 2000). It wants to turn consumers into 
Disney citizens who have a sense of belonging to the Disney world. Not only does 
Disney dismiss cultural diff erences in meaning-making, the park management also 
ignores local laws by refusing to let uniformed food inspectors to enter the park.5 
The park is constructed in a remote part of Hong Kong where space is devoid of 
any geographical and cultural references. Visitors at Disneyland are not supposed 
to believe they are in Hong Kong or China, but in the magical Disneyland. The 
Hong Kong Government wanted the park to refl ect Chinese culture, but Disney 
rejected by arguing that visitors should have a genuine Disney experience (Slater 
1999). Disney changed its mind only aft er the park failed to att ract enough mainland 
Chinese tourists (Fowler 2008).
In order to ensure the fl ow of consumers to Disneyland, the Hong Kong govern-
ment encourages the fl ow of mainland Chinese tourists to Hong Kong to consume. 
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The Hong Kong Government believed that Disneyland would magically lift  Hong 
Kong out of economic recession. Encountering the declining number of tourists aft er 
1997, the Hong Kong Government heavily lobbied the Chinese Central Govern-
ment to relax tourist regulation so that more mainland Chinese could visit Hong 
Kong to consume. The Chinese National Tourism Administration abolished the 
tourist quota system in 2002 and banks were allowed to exchange foreign currency. 
Launched in 2003, “individual visit scheme” (the Chinese name is appropriately 
called “freedom walk”) allowed residents in four Guangdong cities to travel over-
seas without joining a tour group. As of 2006, residents of the entire Guangdong 
province and those of 21 cities in other provinces were permitt ed to travel to 81 
countries (the US not being one of them). Hong Kong benefi ts economically: In 
2005, more than half of the 23 million visitors were mainland Chinese; 2.5 million 
of them visited Disneyland in the fi rst two months.6 The Hong Kong government 
even suggested to the Chinese Central government that special Disney visa could 
be granted to mainland Chinese visitors.
The fl ow of mainland Chinese visitors has an implication on an international 
division of labour in a global space, which alters social relations and unsett les the 
meaning of Hong Kong Chinese. Locals who work in the tourist industry fi nd 
themselves serving mainland Chinese who historically have been seen as a back-
ward, uncivilised, lower class under the colonial “Hong Kong Chinese” discourse. 
The consumption power of mainland Chinese tourists is now comparable to, if not 
superior to that of tourists from other countries. If consumption power no longer 
diff erentiates Hong Kong Chinese from mainland Chinese, then what is left  of this 
constructed identity? Similar to how the media singled out South Korean farm-
ers as the villains who endangered the livelihood of Hong Kong Chinese during 
the WTO protest, Disney management and the local media singled out mainland 
Chinese visitors as bad citizens. In a private space, a bad citizen is someone who 
does not spend enough. 
The management feels that mainland Chinese tourists need to modify their 
behaviour so that the park can run more. For example, the park found Chinese 
tourists spend a lot of time taking pictures, spend litt le money on souvenirs, and 
crowd at the restaurants at the same time. As the park does not understand why, 
unlike Americans, mainland Chinese eat lunch only during lunch hours, the man-
agement decides education is essential to change visitors’ behaviour. The remedy 
is to control imagination (Wasko 2001). The park issues a one-page Chinese guide 
instructing tourists how to enjoy Disneyland, and why it is enjoyable (Fowler and 
Marr 2006). The company also runs television advertisements in mainland China 
explicating how to enjoy Disneyland with family. The advertising executive stated 
that the park has to hold the hands of Chinese consumers and tell them what to 
expect (Marr and Fowler 2006). Both the Hong Kong Government and the park 
hope to familiarise mainland Chinese with Disney by having Disney characters 
tour major Chinese cities and by broadcasting TV programmes starring Hong Kong 
and mainland pop stars to introduce the theme park.7
The local media reinforce the diff erence between mainland Chinese and Hong 
Kong Chinese by highlighting the former’s ignorance of consumer lifestyle. For 
example, for games that require verbal explanation, visitors can queue at the Can-
tonese line (for Hong Kong Chinese), the Mandarin line (for mainland Chinese 
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and Taiwanese), or the English line (for the rest). The media advise the locals to 
line up at the English line if the Cantonese one is long because the Mandarin line 
is said to be less orderly and civilised. The local media tirelessly contrast the dif-
ferences between Hong Kong Chinese and mainland Chinese. The former were 
portrayed as jaded, sophisticated consumers who are well-versed in the rules of 
consumption. The locals compared the Hong Kong park with those overseas and 
lamented inadequate space and choices. The mainland Chinese, on the other hand, 
were portrayed as clueless consumers who have litt le respect for civil behaviour 
and litt le regard for personal hygiene. Similar to South Korean farmers during the 
WTO protest, the use of space of mainland Chinese in Disneyland is scrutinised. 
For example, visitors are not allowed to sit on the sidewalk because this behaviour 
is associated with mainland Chinese. 
Returning to Space
Political economists and cultural studies theorists both argue that citizenship 
can only be fostered in public space. Yet, it is unknown if public space automati-
cally creates a stronger citizenship. This paper argues that practice of citizenship 
has to be understood in a local sett ing because (1) the concept of citizenship implies 
universalism without taking particularities into account; (2) there is an assumption 
that social actors understand what citizenship means and fi nd it meaningful; (3) a 
neoliberal spatiotemporal ideology governs how space is interpreted. 
This paper looks at how the state, the media, and the locals interpret the mean-
ings of space and construct citizenship during the WTO meeting and inside the 
Hong Kong Disneyland. Due to British colonisation and then re-unifi cation with 
China, the Hong Kong Chinese identity is argued to be a vague and ambiguous 
form of citizenship. It is more of a racially/ethnically exclusive and consumerist 
identity. Precisely because of its unclear nature, the meanings of citizenship can be 
molded by the state, the media, the corporation, and the locals to achieve political 
economic purpose.
Scholars have argued that naturalised social relations can be unsett led in global 
space, yet global space can also solidify the interests of a particular social group. Fac-
ing the changing social relations under an integrated global economy, social groups 
oft en respond by asserting their group rights in the forms of cultural politics, ethnic 
identities, local communities, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism (Islin and 
Wood 1999; Robertson 1995; Della Porta et al. 2006). The disfranchised population 
oft en looks up to the media to learn who they are as citizens (Croucher 2003).
The cases of the WTO meeting and Hong Kong Disneyland are two illustrative 
but diff erent examples to show how the state, the media and the locals reinforce the 
Hong Kong Chinese identity by demonising the Other – South Korean farmers in 
the WTO meeting and mainland Chinese in Hong Kong Disneyland. Appropriat-
ing a neoliberal spatiotemporal frame, the media believe space should facilitate a 
maximum fl ow of capital. Therefore when WTO protestors make themselves visible 
in public space and when mainland Chinese fl out rules in Disneyland, the media 
highlighted how these two social groups endangered Hong Kong economy and 
the Hong Kong Chinese identity.
Although the cases of WTO meeting and Hong Kong Disneyland are repre-
sentative of how global space is interpreted and how that interpretation is related 
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to the construction of citizenship, there are many cases in which the neoliberal 
spatiotemporal order may not apply. It is unarguable that Hong Kong is a global 
city, but is everywhere in Hong Kong a global space? To give an extreme example, 
is prison a global space? There are instances that show global space is temporar-
ily void of global capital accumulation. For example, the very streets that WTO 
protestors matched on have also held a few, large-scaled mass demonstration in 
which Hong Kong people showed their grievances towards the bad governance 
during the tenure of the fi rst Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. In that context, was 
the global space no longer global because it does not accumulate capital? Did the 
global space return to public space?
The above questions imply that as powerful as (economic) globalisation theories 
and international political economy are to explain the changing nature of space 
and social relations, they do have their blindspots.
Notes:
1. As someone who grew up in Hong Kong and underwent a colonial education from kindergarten 
to graduate school, this section was written from an interpretivist, autoethnographic perspective.
2. The television news examined come from the Chinese channels of the two Hong Kong television 
stations TVB and ATV. TVB, in particular, almost monopolies the local television market by owning 
80 percent market share of broadcast television. Its status is unchallenged by the underdog ATV 
and the newcomer cable television. It is possible that TV audience watch the evening news of 
both stations as ATV’s one starts at six and TVB’s half an hour later. WTO-related news from the time 
period December 5, 2005-January 2, 2006 were used for the analysis
3. “Chief Secretary for Administration: Hong Kong Disneyland A Sound Investment.” Hong Kong 
Government press release. 2 November, 1999.
4. “Transcript of press conference on HK Disneyland project.” Hong Kong Government press release. 
November 3, 1999.
5. The daily operation of the park shows how Disney strictly controls the Disneyland image. Soon 
after its opening, two uniformed food inspectors who wished to investigate a reported case of food 
poisoning were asked to remove their caps and badges to conceal their identities. The local media 
later criticised the abuse of power by Disney (“Disney’s hegemony incites public anger” 2005). 
6. Market summary (Feb. 2006) – Mainland China. The Network for HK Tourism Partners.
7. Pop stars narrating their love for Hong Kong. Discover Hong Kong. http://www.
discoverhongkong.com/taiwan/tvprogram/index.jhtml. Last access: June 14 2006.
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